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EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT IN ANTITRUST 
ELYSE DORSEY† & JONATHAN M. JACOBSON†† 
INTRODUCTION 
American society has a long history of encouraging 
competition and a long history of abhorring monopoly.  Often 
those two goals are complementary, but not always.  What 
happens if a company competes so aggressively that it wipes out 
its competitors and gets a monopoly?  Is that good or bad?  The 
easy answer is that normal competition is fine, but unfair or 
predatory competition is not.  But that easy answer is not 
particularly helpful.  It is often very hard to distinguish the good 
from the bad.  Low prices are good, right?  But what if they are 
below cost so that rivals cannot compete? 
Courts and commentators have struggled hard for many 
decades to develop rules that separate the lawful conduct of a 
single firm from the unlawful.  That struggle continues today.  
We trace a bit of the history of this struggle, summarize where 
the courts are today, and then offer a few suggestions for a path 
going forward. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
While “exclusionary” or “predatory” conduct lies at the heart 
of antitrust law’s single firm proscription,1 the precise definitions 
of these terms have evaded and intrigued courts and scholars 
 
† Member, District of Columbia and Virginia Bars. 
†† Member, New York Bar. This paper was delivered by Mr. Jacobson as the 
Lewis Berstein Memorial Lecture at St. John’s University School of Law on October 
20, 2014. The authors thank Josh Wright, Greg Werden, and Danny Sokol for 
helpful comments. All mistakes remain ours alone. 
1 The governing statute, section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012), 
provides in part: “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony . . . .” The statute has not been used criminally for decades. 
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and have been the source of much consternation for decades.2  
Courts have repeatedly recognized that “[w]hether any particular 
act of a monopolist is exclusionary, rather than merely a form of 
vigorous competition, can be difficult to discern: the means of 
illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are 
myriad.”3  Analyzing the derivations of the exclusionary conduct 
concept and its tumultuous development over the past 120 years 
is, therefore, useful to understanding how antitrust law regards 
single-firm conduct today—and especially to attempting to 
separate the conduct we encourage from the behavior we 
condemn. 
We begin at the beginning.  Congress passed the Sherman 
Act in 1890 in response to a rash of corporate consolidations and 
a growing perception that the “trusts” being created threatened 
to impair the free market economy and to impose upon the 
country a system comprised solely of behemoth businesses  
well-poised to exploit the population at large.4  The expansion of 
these “great trusts” had accelerated in the dozen or so years 
leading up to 1890—with well-despised trusts such as Standard 
Oil5 and American Tobacco,6 as well as the Beef,7 Sugar,8 and 
Gunpowder9 trusts, seeming to proliferate.  These and other 
 
2 See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927 (10th Cir. 
1975) (noting the term “predatory” “probably does not have a well-defined meaning 
in the context it was used, but it certainly bears a sinister connotation”). 
3 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per 
curiam); Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC, 148 F.3d 1080, 1087 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (“ ‘Anticompetitive conduct’ can come in too many different forms, 
and is too dependent upon context, for any court or commentator ever to have 
enumerated all the varieties.”). 
4 See, e.g., EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD 2000-1887, at 127 (John L. 
Thomas ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1967) (predicting the tendency toward trusts 
would persist until society would be transformed into one great trust); Sanford D. 
Gordon, Attitudes Towards Trusts Prior to the Sherman Act, 30 S. ECON. J. 156, 159 
(1963) (detailing the growing concern across various sectors of the country with the 
problem of the great trusts and noting that thirteen states passed antitrust 
legislation before Congress passed the Sherman Act, but that when the states 
enforced their antitrust laws, the trusts would merely “incorporate[] in other states 
and continue[] their activities as they had done before the court’s decisions”); Robert 
H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The 
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 82–83 (1982). 
5 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
6 See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
7 See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). 
8 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
9 See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 188 F. 127 (C.C.D. 
Del. 1911). 
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trusts monopolized their industries, raised prices, and excluded 
competitors.10  And their abuses, both realized and potential, 
created a political firestorm.11 
Enter the Sherman Act.  A relatively simple  
statute—especially compared to many of its modern 
counterparts—the Sherman Act was intended, in part, to codify 
common law at the federal level.12  It was comprised of two main 
sections.  Section 1 was directed at combinations or conspiracies 
among two or more actors.13  Section 2—which was not a 
codification of common law principles—was directed at efforts to 
monopolize by a single firm or firms, that is, unilateral conduct.14  
Despite its apparent simplicity, the Sherman Act had the 
capacity to encompass a multitude of anticompetitive sins.15 
While it was utilized in its first several decades to address 
the problem of the original great trusts, the Act’s development 
outside this narrow arena—that is, where large corporate 
consolidations yielded firms of monopoly size that engaged in 
abusive conduct16—occurred more slowly.17  Its broad language 
left open for development the concept of “monopolization” and its 
myriad manifestations and abuses, but the many gaps were not 
immediately filled.18  For the first sixty years following its 
 
10 See, e.g., id. at 151–52. 
11 See HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 163 (1954); see also 
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) (“[M]onopoly power, whether 
lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned 
under s 2 even though it remains unexercised.”). 
12 E.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1997); United States v. 
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d, 326 U.S. 
1 (1945). 
13 Sherman Antitrust Act ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)). 
14 Ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)). 
15 See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106, 181 (1911) (“[T]he generic 
designation of the 1st and 2d sections of the law, when taken together, embraced 
every conceivable act which could possibly come within the spirit or purpose of the 
prohibitions of the law, without regard to the garb in which such acts were 
clothed.”). 
16 Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 
NW. U. L. REV. 281, 282–83 (1956); see also N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 
197, 356–58 (1904) (holding by a 5-4 majority that the Sherman Act applies to stock 
acquisitions). 
17 Director & Levi, supra note 16, at 282. 
18 Jonathan M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years of Antitrust Injury: 
Down the Alley with Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273,  
274–75 (1998). 
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passage, for example, there was some, but very little, private 
enforcement.19  The Act as originally enacted contained the now 
well-known treble damages remedy for private enforcement,20 but 
only 157 treble damages actions were recorded between 1899 and 
1939, with only fourteen plaintiffs recovering less than $275,000 
total.21 
Indeed, the first truly significant single-firm conduct  
case—the U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) case against 
Alcoa—was not initiated until 1938, almost fifty years after the 
Act was passed.22  This case yielded one of the most significant 
precedents within antitrust law: an opinion by Judge Learned 
Hand in 1945 for the Second Circuit.23  That court was sitting as 
the court of last resort by special act of Congress because the 
Supreme Court lacked a quorum.24  The court famously held that 
a firm that intentionally acquires monopoly power violates 
section 2.25  Following decades of dominance, the DOJ had 
accused Alcoa of monopolizing the aluminum ingot market, and 
the court concluded Alcoa’s control of this market exceeded 
ninety percent.26  After rendering this conclusion, the court 
turned to evaluating whether Alcoa violated the Sherman Act.27  
The court noted that, merely because Alcoa had achieved such 
monopoly power, it did not necessarily violate section 2, 
recognizing that “[t]he successful competitor, having been urged 
to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”28  
Nonetheless, given the touchstone of intent, the court quickly 
concluded Alcoa had unlawfully monopolized the aluminum ingot 
market principally by expanding its production capacity such 
that consumers did not need to turn to Alcoa’s competitors for 
supply.29  Thus, the court ultimately held that unless monopoly 
 
19 Id. at 275. 
20 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (repealed 1914). 
21 Jacobson & Greer, supra note 18, at 275 & n.16. 
22 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1945) 
[hereinafter Alcoa]. 
23 Id. 
24 Act of June 9, 1944, ch. 239, 58 Stat. 272, amended by Act of Dec. 21, 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93–528, 88 Stat. 1706. 
25 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431–32. 
26 Id. at 425. 
27 Id. at 426–32. 
28 Id. at 429–30. 
29 Id. at 431 (“It was not inevitable that [Alcoa] should always anticipate 
increases in the demand for ingot and be prepared to supply them. Nothing 
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was “thrust upon” Alcoa or “merely [the result] of . . . skill, 
foresight and industry,” the act of monopolization was intentional 
and therefore unlawful.30 
The court’s conception of monopolization in United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of America31 (“Alcoa”) became the leading 
standard, reigning supreme from its first articulation through 
the 1970s.  It was adopted and reiterated by the courts, and was 
largely codified in the Court’s 1966 decision in United States v. 
Grinnell Corp.32  In that case, the Supreme Court articulated the 
monopolization formula still used today, holding that unlawful 
monopolization is “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the 
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of 
that power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic 
accident.”33  The effect of applying the Alcoa rule under this 
articulation was that, once monopoly power was proven, it was 
difficult for any defendant to avoid condemnation under section 
2. 
This rule and its effect were informed by developments 
occurring in the area of price discrimination under the Clayton 
Act and the 1936 amendments known as the Robinson-Patman 
Act.34  The pervading sense in this early era was that selective 
price cutting that damaged rivals was harmful in and of itself.35  
This sense largely derived from the understanding that it was 
unfair for large buyers to receive discounts simply because they 
were large, and that small businesses should be protected 
against such unwarranted disparity of treatment.36  As such, the 
 
compelled it to keep doubling and redoubling its capacity before others entered the 
field. It insists that it never excluded competitors, but we can think of no more 
effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, 
and to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great 
organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of 
personnel.”). 
30 Id. at 430. 
31 See generally id. 
32 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
33 Id. The phrasing drew from the government’s brief. See Brief for the United 
States at 41, United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (“[T]he willful 
acquisition or maintenance of that power, i.e., that such power was not ‘thrust upon’ 
its possessor.”) (citation omitted). 
34 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012). 
35 See generally LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS (1934). 
36 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948) (“The 
legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it abundantly clear that 
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Clayton Act was passed in 1914, “born of a desire by Congress to 
curb the use by financially powerful corporations of localized 
price-cutting tactics which had gravely impaired the competitive 
position of other sellers.”37  Finding this Act, alone, 
unsatisfactory, Congress soon after supplemented it with the 
Robinson-Patman Act, which “was aimed at a specific weapon of 
the monopolist—predatory pricing.”38  The Robinson-Patman Act 
attacked predatory pricing by prohibiting price discrimination 
“between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and 
quality”;39 this prohibition meant a supplier was foreclosed both 
from charging lower prices in certain geographic areas while 
leaving prices intact in other areas, so as to leverage its market 
power and drive competitors out of business, and from offering 
buyers volume discounts, among other things.40 
Reflecting the animosity toward price discrimination 
characteristic of the time, courts applying the Robinson-Patman 
Act quickly made clear that—unlike today—civil predatory 
pricing claims under the Robinson-Patman Act did not require a 
demonstration that the defendant’s prices were below cost.41  
Rather, the courts consistently held that many varieties of price 
cutting to one or more, but not all, buyers were unlawful.  The 
Supreme Court in FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,42 for instance, 
noted that the Court had consistently defined “price 
discrimination” for Robinson-Patman purposes as “merely a price 
difference.”43  As many have noted since, this definition denied 
 
Congress considered it to be an evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive 
advantage over a small buyer solely because of the large buyer’s quantity purchasing 
ability. The Robinson-Patman Act was passed to deprive a large buyer of such 
advantages . . . .”). 
37 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543 (1960). 
38 United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 33–34 (1963). 
39 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). 
40 Id. 
41 Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. at 547–48; Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co., 
348 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1954); Cont’l Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 
F.2d 97, 104 (10th Cir. 1973); Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n , 412 
F.2d 605, 616 (7th Cir. 1969). Criminal Robinson-Patman claims did require a 
demonstration of below-cost pricing. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. at 33–34 
(1963). 
42 363 U.S. 536. 
43 Id. at 549 (“When this Court has spoken of price discrimination in s 2(a) 
cases, it has generally assumed that the term was synonymous with price 
differentiation.”); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44–45 
(1948) (identifying the “avowed purpose” of the Robinson-Patman Amendment as 
“protect[ing] competition from all price differentials except those based in full on cost 
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large buyers the benefits of economies of scale and otherwise 
eliminated the beneficial effects that price discrimination could 
offer.44  Given this emblematic backdrop, many cases seemingly 
illogical to us today were fairly commonplace throughout this 
period.45 
Indeed, much of the conduct that is universally recognized as 
enhancing consumer welfare today was condemned as unlawful 
monopolization in the Alcoa era.  In Utah Pie Co. v. Continental 
Baking Co.,46 for example, the Court analyzed claims that the 
defendants violated the antitrust laws by lowering their prices on 
frozen pies in order to entice distributor grocery stores into 
buying their pies rather than their competitors’ and creating 
what the Court called a “declining price structure.”47  The court 
concluded these allegations, along with evidence that distributors 
did, in fact, buy more of the defendants’ pies, were sufficient to 
support an antitrust violation.48  In holding that “a competitor 
who is forced to reduce his price to a new all-time low in a 
market of declining prices will in time feel the financial pinch 
and will be a less effective competitive force,” the Court 
essentially entirely discounted the consumer welfare benefits 
attendant to the lower prices and increased output deriving from 
this price competition.49  Today, it is unfathomable that a 
 
savings” to the supplier, and holding “Congress meant by using the words 
‘discrimination in price’ in s 2 that in a case involving competitive injury between a 
seller’s customers the Commission need only prove that a seller had charged one 
purchaser a higher price for like goods than he had charged one or more of the 
purchaser’s competitors”); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 721 
(1948) (defining “discrimination in price” as “selling the same kind of goods cheaper 
to one purchaser than to another”); Moss v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 148 F.2d 378, 379 
(2d Cir. 1945) (holding that proof of a price differential itself constituted 
“discrimination in price,” where the competitive injury in question was between 
sellers). 
44 See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, The Transformation of Vertical Restraints: Per Se 
Illegality, the Rule of Reason and Per Se Legality, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1003, 1012–13 
(2014). 
45 Scholars have documented the significant shift in application of the Robinson-
Patman Act since its first enactment. See, e.g., Ryan Luchs et al., The End of the 
Robinson-Patman Act? Evidence from Legal Case Data, 56 MGMT. SCI. 2123 (2010); 
D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson Patman, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015). 
46 386 U.S. 685 (1967). 
47 Id. at 689–91, 703. 
48 Id. at 699–700 (decided under the Robinson-Patman Act, applying Sherman 
Act principles). 
49 Id. 
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competitor could successfully bring such a case; modern courts 
are, rightfully, quite skeptical of antitrust allegations in which 
the alleged anticompetitive conduct is the defendant’s price 
decreases.  Price competition is the paradigmatic consumer 
benefit of competitive markets and only in the rarest of instances 
entails a real potential for anticompetitive harms.  But, in the 
late 1960s, this line of analysis had yet to be adopted by the 
courts.50 
II. INFLUENCE OF CHICAGO ECONOMICS 
Largely owing to cases like Utah Pie, antitrust law became a 
focal point for many law and economics scholars from the 1950s 
forward.  These scholars analyzed the current state of the law 
and, in many cases, found antitrust to be a meandering and 
incoherent jumble.51  Their findings led to serious academic 
challenges to the Alcoa-Grinnell paradigm and to a strong push 
to incorporate microeconomic principles into antitrust analysis.52  
What is known as the “Chicago School” was at the forefront of 
these challenges.53 
Rigorous debates, led by prominent scholars at the 
University of Chicago and spearheaded by Aaron Director, called 
into question the very foundations of antitrust law as it had been 
adopted and implemented by the courts.54  These scholars derided 
antitrust’s internal inconsistencies, and proffered that tethering 
 
50 See United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 33–34 (1963). 
51 See, e.g., Edward D. Cavanagh, Antitrust Law and Economic Theory: Finding 
a Balance, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 123, 125–29 (2013). 
52 For an excellent history and analysis of the integration of economics into 
antitrust law, see id. at 130–48. 
53 Id. at 140–41. 
54 See RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, 
ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS xvi (2d ed. 1981) (“Much of the economic 
analysis expounded in these notes is based on ideas first proposed by Director. A 
number of these ideas were later developed and published by other economists 
whose work we cite, but these citations conceal Director’s seminal role in the 
development of the economics of competition and monopoly presented in this book.”); 
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Timothy J. Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond: Time 
To Let Go of the 20th Century, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 147, 150 (2012) (“The historical 
accounts of the Chicago School of Antitrust uniformly agree on the central influence 
of Aaron Director and the Antitrust Law course he taught with Edward Levi at the 
University of Chicago.”); William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of 
Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 1221, 1229–30 (1989). See generally Director & Levi, supra note 16; Sam 
Peltzman, Aaron Director’s Influence on Antitrust Policy, 48 J.L. & ECON. 313 
(2005). 
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antitrust law to economic analysis would bring the order and 
consistency for which they believed antitrust was so desperate.  
Director and Levi, for example, criticized the inherent tension in 
Alcoa—which espoused the importance of not turning upon the 
successful competitor but went on to do just that—noting rather 
tongue-in-cheekily that “[p]erhaps . . . the successful competitor 
can be turned upon when he wins, because he has been told not 
to compete.”55 
Director’s and others’ critiques, in turn, sparked the famous 
“Fortune Magazine Debates,” a series of papers with Robert H. 
Bork and Ward S. Bowman, Jr. on one side, arguing that the 
time had come for an antitrust reckoning, and Harlan H. Blake 
and William K. Jones on the other, defending antitrust law 
largely as it was.56  Following Director and Levi, Bork and 
Bowman contended there existed “a fundamental and widespread 
misconception of the nature and virtues of the competitive 
process,” and argued that the true value of competition lay in its 
ability to “provide[] society with the maximum output that can be 
achieved at any given time with the resources at its command.”57  
Blake and Jones, meanwhile, argued competition should be 
protected for reasons other than economic efficiency; political 
objectives, such as protecting individual freedom and 
opportunity, were, in their view, worthy antitrust goals.58 
Ultimately, many of Bork and Bowman’s positions were 
embraced by antitrust law more broadly.  Bork expanded upon 
the issues in his seminal book, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at 
 
55 Director & Levi, supra note 16, at 286. Director did not publish his antitrust 
analysis. This Law and the Future paper, written largely by Levi, is his only 
significant published work. His influence instead was carried orally, first by himself, 
and later by his many followers, most prominently Robert Bork. 
56 See Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. 
L. REV. 377 (1965); Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward a Three-
Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422 (1965); Robert H. Bork & Ward 
S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965); Robert H. 
Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 401 (1965); Ward S. 
Bowman, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: II, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 417 (1965).  
57 Bork & Bowman, supra note 56, at 364–65. Competition, they proffered, could 
conceivably be injured when either (1) consenting parties purposefully eliminate 
competition by, for example, agreement, acquisition, or merger, or (2) competitors 
compete too successfully and injure their rivals. Only the first scenario should be 
protected by antitrust laws, because doing so promotes the efficient allocation of 
resources, while the second protects less efficient competitors, keeping prices high 
and output low. See Bork, supra note 56, at 401–02. 
58 Blake & Jones, supra note 56, at 427–36. 
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War with Itself.59  Here, Bork more fully explicated his argument 
that antitrust law, as developed by the courts, suffered from fatal 
internal conflicts—or, more colorfully, from schizophrenia.60  
Rather than considering the protection of competitors—which led 
to odd scenarios such as Utah Pie where the courts condemned 
conduct that benefited consumers but harmed certain 
competitors—Bork argued antitrust should seek to protect 
consumers.61  He proffered that the Sherman Act was designed as 
a “consumer welfare prescription,” and that, both as policy and 
economic matters, focusing upon consumer welfare was the 
solution for resolving antitrust’s inconsistencies.62  He 
underscored the point by observing that having multiple diffuse 
goals makes antitrust unworkable.63  While protecting 
competitors meant keeping prices high and output low, the 
precise conditions occurring in monopolistic, anticompetitive 
markets, protecting consumers also promoted price decreases, 
output increases, and enhancements in services and product 
quality. 
The argument that antitrust should protect consumers—that 
is, that it should encourage lower prices, higher production, 
better quality, faster innovation, and so forth—was the key 
contribution of the Chicago School.64  The Chicago School rejected 
the idea that protecting competitors was an acceptable purpose of 
antitrust law.65  If competitors lost opportunities because they 
were less efficient, that was a good thing, not a bad one. 
The Chicago School’s world view was informed 
predominantly by (1) economic teachings and (2) the error cost 
framework.66  Chicagoans believed antitrust law should be 
informed by, and respond to, what economic theory and empirical 
 
59 See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR 
WITH ITSELF (1993). 
60 Bork & Bowman, supra note 56, at 364. 
61 BORK, supra note 59, at 66. 
62 Id. Bork’s concept of “consumer welfare,” a new phrase at the time, was a 
shorthand for “the total welfare of all consumers as a class.” Id. at 110. That concept 
should be distinguished from “consumer welfare” in the economic sense of “consumer 
surplus.” See Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason: Only Competition 
Matters, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 718–26 (2014). 
63 BORK, supra note 59, at 50. 
64 Id. at xi. 
65 Id. at 50–51. 
66 Page, supra note 54, at 1240–41. 
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evidence suggested regarding particular conduct.67  Economic 
theory could illuminate the circumstances under which certain 
behaviors were likely to yield anticompetitive effects, while 
empirical evidence could demonstrate how often, in fact, such 
circumstances occurred and whether they did or did not dampen 
competition.68 
The error cost framework, meanwhile, posited that Type I, 
false positive, errors in antitrust enforcement—which 
erroneously condemn procompetitive behavior—would be far 
more costly than Type II, false negative, errors, or those that fail 
to punish anticompetitive behavior.69  Erroneous imposition of 
antitrust liability, it was argued, not only eliminates competitive 
actions of the firm facing liability, thereby reducing the level of 
competition within that industry, but further has a reverberating 
effect across the economy.70  The chilling effects of erroneous 
condemnation may be quite severe:  Because antitrust trebles 
damages, similarly situated firms are sure to stay far afield of 
any procompetitive behaviors resembling those previously 
condemned, meaning that levels of competition outside of the 
industry at issue may also diminish in response.71  Type II errors, 
on the other hand, allow anticompetitive actions to persist.  
Chicagoans argued—based on theory rather than empirics—that 
these errors raise fewer concerns as such anticompetitive 
behavior can yield above average returns, thereby attracting new 
entry and more competition.72  In other words, they argued, we 
can expect the industry to experience some degree of  
self-correction over time.73  Combined, the error cost framework 
and reliance upon economics yielded a prescription for antitrust 
law that was far more hands-off than antitrust had historically 
been. 
The Chicago School’s suggestions were largely, but not 
entirely, successful.  Its notions that antitrust should take its 
cues from economic teachings and strive to preserve competition, 
not competitors, rapidly ascended, promoted by prominent 
 
67 BORK, supra note 59, at 430. 
68 Page, supra note 54, at 1242. 
69 Id. at 1243. 
70 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15–16 
(1984). 
71 Id. at 34. 
72 Id. at 15. 
73 Id. 
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Chicagoans like Lester Telser,74 John McGee,75 and, later, 
Richard Posner76 and Frank Easterbrook.77  As developed below, 
the courts endorsed and adopted a number of these views and 
continue to rely upon many of these insights today. 
More controversial was orthodox Chicagoans’ proposal for a 
total welfare approach to antitrust.  Although they used the term 
“consumer welfare,” these scholars actually endorsed an 
approach under which a wealth transfer from consumers to 
producers, alone, should not be actionable.78  For these orthodox 
Chicagoans, efficiency was the only proper goal of antitrust law; 
the evil of monopolization was considered to be the so-called 
“deadweight loss” that arises when firms with monopoly power 
restrict output and increase prices.79  Enforcement, under this 
view, was to be limited to those contexts in which the conduct 
yielded a deadweight welfare loss.80  If, for example, certain 
behavior merely transferred benefits from consumers to 
producers, thereby resulting in a producer surplus but no 
deadweight loss to society, this result was efficient to the market 
overall and should be recognized as such.81 
This paradigm was intended to be, and was, a recipe for 
laissez-faire.  While the degree to which Chicago scholars 
embraced the laissez-faire approach varied, many advocated for a 
strong hands-off policy towards exclusionary conduct—apart 
from cartels and mergers to monopoly.82  These scholars proffered 
the laissez-faire approach should succeed even in cases where a 
 
74 See, e.g., Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3. 
J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960). 
75 See, e.g., John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) 
Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137, 137–38 (1958). 
76 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001). 
77 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 
(1984). 
78 BORK, supra note 59, at 66, 97; see, e.g., Ken Heyer, Robert Bork and Welfare 
Standards, J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2015); Lande, supra note 4, at 75; Sokol, 
supra note 44, at 1007–08.  
79 BORK, supra note 59, at 101. 
80 See id. 
81 Id. 
82 See, e.g., Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 54, at 154 (“The early Chicago 
School analyses did produce nearly uniform results in rejecting the existing, non-
economic-based antitrust doctrine of the 1960s. But agreement on what not to do 
does not mean agreement on what to do.”); Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning 
Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-Based Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 241, 244–45 (2012) (noting the “heterogeneity in both economic approaches and 
policy prescriptions” within the Chicago school). 
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deadweight loss was a real prospect, proposing such rules as 
banning competitor lawsuits83 and per se legality for vertical 
restraints.84  To these scholars, the risks attendant to 
misdiagnosing and condemning anticompetitive conduct 
outweighed the potential benefits of correctly capturing truly 
anticompetitive conduct, which was perceived to occur 
comparatively infrequently. 
The Chicago School’s general adoption of the laissez-faire 
approach is often contrasted to the “Harvard” School’s approach, 
which developed at the same time.  Scholars within the Harvard 
School largely agreed with the call for antitrust to employ an 
economic approach but did not at all agree with the ultimate 
laissez-faire prescription.85  Impactful scholars such as Phillip 
Areeda, Donald F. Turner, and Herbert Hovenkamp86 recognized 
the troubles plaguing antitrust, but proffered an approach 
allowing for a more hands-on response to potential competition 
issues.  Like the orthodox Chicago scholars, their work 
contributed significantly to antitrust law’s overhaul.  Areeda and 
Turner’s article on predatory pricing under section 2, for 
instance, is one of the most influential pieces in the history of 
American law.87  The combination of efforts from the Chicago and 






83 Easterbrook, supra note 70, at 34–37. 
84 BORK, supra note 59, at 288 (“[E]very vertical restraint should be completely 
lawful.”); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted 
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 9, 23–26 (1981). 
85 For example, Areeda and Turner likewise noted the dangers of allowing 
competitor suits, specifically in the context of predatory pricing claims. See Phillip 
Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Practices Under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699 (1975) (arguing that in framing antitrust 
rules for predatory pricing “extreme care be taken . . . lest the threat of litigation, 
particularly by private parties, materially deter legitimate, competitive pricing”). 
86 While Herbert Hovenkamp is largely associated with the Harvard School, in 
some of his writings he appears to take a more Chicagoan tact. See, e.g., HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION (2005). 
87 Areeda & Turner, supra note 85, at 698 (articulating the now well-understood 
notion that “predatory pricing would make little economic sense to a potential 
predator unless he had (1) greater financial staying power than his rivals, and (2) a 
very substantial prospect that the losses he incurs in the predatory campaign will be 
exceeded by the profits to be earned after his rivals have been destroyed”). 
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analysis—which both aligned with economic theory and reacted 
to empirical evidence—brought meaningful and lasting change to 
antitrust.88 
III. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE 
Over the course of the period from the mid 1970s to the 
present, the law applicable to dominant firm conduct changed 
almost completely in a manner perhaps unsurpassed in legal 
history.  Many types of conduct that were almost certainly illegal 
in 1975 were almost certainly legal in 2010 and remain so 
today.89  Antitrust courts’ reaction to the laissez-faire total 
welfare approach varied, but they readily adopted an economic 
approach, applying theory and empirical evidence in a fact-
intensive analysis of the cases at hand. 
For analysis of exclusionary conduct under section 2, this 
transformation began in 1975 in the Tenth Circuit case, Telex 
Corp. v. IBM.90  In that case, Telex accused IBM of engaging in 
predatory conduct by, among other things, examining its 
competitors’ pricing and strategies, and adjusting its own pricing 
and strategies accordingly.91  Analyzing these allegations and 
applying its understanding of antitrust law and economics, the 
Tenth Circuit rejected the notion that Alcoa’s “thrust upon” 
language meant a monopolist’s allegedly predatory conduct must 
be “entirely involuntary.”92  The court recognized that this 
conception would entrench a firm in a state of stasis once it 
acquired monopoly power, essentially prohibiting the firm from 
further competing—and that such stasis is, itself, antithetical to 
antitrust’s goals of enhancing the competitive process.93 
 
 
88 For a critical view, see Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the 
Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 
1513, 1569–70 (1984). 
89 See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. 
Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 
2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 3–5. 
90 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975). Arguably, the first signs of an antitrust shift 
came in a merger case, United States v. General Dynamics Corp., decided the year 
before. 415 U.S. 486, 511 (1974). But Telex was the first case to seriously revisit the 
concept of exclusionary conduct under section 2. 
91 Telex, 510 F.2d at 900–02. 
92 Id. at 927. 
93 Id. at 927–28. 
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The Supreme Court and the courts of appeals subsequently, 
and similarly, began applying the Chicago and Harvard 
approaches and, accordingly, narrowing antitrust law’s scope in 
other areas, including with respect to competitor suits94 and 
vertical distribution restrictions.95  In recrafting the antitrust 
rules, the courts were heavily influenced by the economic 
approach to antitrust generally and to section 2 particularly.  In 
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,96 for example, the 
Second Circuit explained the “rightful” meaning of Alcoa’s 
statement that section 2 prohibits even well-behaved monopolies 
was that “if monopoly power has been acquired or maintained 
through improper means, the fact that the power has not been 
used to extract improper benefits provides no succor to the 
monopolist.”97  Indeed, as scholars had urged was necessary, the 
Berkey Court distinguished between a firm’s procompetitively 
exercising the benefits of its size, such as by taking advantage of 
scale economies, and its abusing its size to the detriment of 
consumers, by, for instance, engaging in actions that “are 
possible or effective only if taken by a firm that dominates its 
smaller rivals.”98 
Similarly, in California Computer Products v. IBM,99 the 
Ninth Circuit recognized that, “[w]here the opportunity exists to 
increase or protect market share profitably by offering equivalent 
or superior performance at a lower price, even a virtual 
monopolist may do so.”100  These cases essentially eschewed the 
aspects of Alcoa that would condemn the successful competitor 
for having succeeded.  In doing so, they began to recognize that  
 
 
94 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) 
(holding an antitrust competitor plaintiff “must prove antitrust injury, which is to 
say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows 
from that which makes the defendants’ acts unlawful” (emphasis added)). 
95 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56–59 (1977); 
Richard Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the 
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 
COLUM. L. REV. 282, 283, 287–88 (1975) (holding a manufacturer’s imposition of 
exclusive geographic distribution restrictions upon its retailers was not per se 
unlawful, but should be evaluated under the rule of reason). 
96 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). 
97 Id. at 274. 
98 Id. at 274–75. 
99 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979). 
100 Id. at 742. 
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protecting competition is not an end unto itself, but merely a 
means for preserving and enhancing consumer welfare and the 
competitive process. 
Continuing in this vein, the courts largely adopted variants 
of Areeda and Turner’s approach to predatory pricing.  The 
courts acknowledged an especially stringent test should apply in 
cases where the proffered anticompetitive conduct related to 
price reductions, in order to avoid chilling price competition.101  
The Supreme Court in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp.,102 for instance, explained that predatory 
pricing schemes are unlikely to be attempted due to their high 
likelihood of failure.  The alleged predator must: (1) forgo 
immediately available profits; (2) successfully drive competitors 
out; and (3) successfully keep competitors out long enough to 
recoup its losses.103  In other words, predatory pricing requires a 
predator to engage in a risky, unprofitable course of action, with 
the hope of not only attaining but also of maintaining monopoly 
power at some later date when it is charging supracompetitive 
prices—often no mean feat, given such high prices inevitably 
entice competitors to enter the market and share in the profits.  
Moreover, as the Court noted, “cutting prices in order to increase 
business often is the very essence of competition.  Thus, mistaken 
inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, because 
they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to 
protect.”104  The Supreme Court reiterated this sentiment in 
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,105 
remarking that it “would be ironic indeed if the standards for 
predatory pricing liability were so low that antitrust suits 
themselves became a tool for keeping prices high.”106 
While embracing many of the Chicago School’s proffered 
approaches, the courts nonetheless rejected some of the more 
extreme Chicago positions.  For instance, the Supreme Court 
 
101 While there is relative consensus today that an antitrust defendant’s prices 
must be below some measure of cost before a section 2 violation can arise, there 
remains significant dispute as to how to measure costs and the circumstances under 
which predatory pricing may—or has—occurred. See generally Symposium, 100 
Years of Standard Oil Antitrust, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 429 (2012). 
102 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
103 Id. at 588–91. 
104 Id. at 594. 
105 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
106 Id. at 226–27. 
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declined to adopt a per se rule denying competitor-plaintiffs 
standing to challenge acquisitions on the basis of predatory 
pricing theories—which many Chicagoans supported—reasoning 
that it “would be novel indeed for a court to deny standing to a 
party seeking an injunction against threatened injury merely 
because such injuries rarely occur.”107  Similarly, the Court 
refused to hold vertical restraints to be per se lawful, though it 
did generally acknowledge such arrangements are often 
associated with procompetitive efficiencies.108 
IV. POST-CHICAGO 
The general laissez-faire approach of the Chicago School 
prevailed in some arenas for a number of years, but by the early 
1990s, it started to become supplanted, at least in academia, by 
what has been called the “Post-Chicago” approach.  For section 2 
purposes, one key insight of this approach was the concept of 
“raising rivals’ costs”109 (“RRC”).  This concept focuses upon a 
 
107 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121–22 (1986). 
108 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762–63 
(1984) (holding vertical agreements between manufacturers and distributors may 
violate the antitrust laws, but recognizing manufacturers and distributors have 
many “legitimate reasons” for coordinating along various dimensions, such as the 
manufacturer’s desire to ensure that outside competitors are not “free-riding” off the 
investments its distributors are making into marketing, hiring, and training 
knowledgeable employees, and so forth). 
109 See Thomas Krattenmaker & Stephen C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: 
Raising Rivals’ Costs To Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 214 (1986); 
Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Cost-Raising Strategies, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 
19, 19–20 (1987); Stephen C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 
AM. ECON. REV. 267, 267 (1983) [hereinafter Raising Rivals’ Costs]. While the raising 
rivals’ costs framework is generally considered the “quintessential example of the 
difference between Chicago School and Post-Chicago School antitrust economics,” 
many scholars have argued that the Chicago school in fact anticipated and 
accounted for these strategies. Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 54, at 161; see, e.g., 
Steven C. Salop, Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Vertical Conduct: Where 
Chicago Has Overshot the Mark, in HOW CHICAGO OVERSHOT THE MARK 141, 145 
(Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (“[I]t is important to recognize that [Post-Chicago RRC 
theory] has its roots in the economic analysis of Chicago School commentators.”); 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 158–
59 (2005) (describing raising rivals’ costs as one of the “foundations of the so-called 
post-Chicago revolution”). But see Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 54, at 159, 161 
(suggesting “the contributions of the Post-Chicago school to antitrust doctrine and 
policy are limited,” and arguing the Chicago school “did not ignore RRC”); Joshua D. 
Wright, Moving Beyond Naive Foreclosure Analysis, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1163, 
1163 n.3 (2012) (“The roots of the modern RRC theory were anticipated by Aaron 
Director and Edward H. Levi.”). 
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competitor’s ability to diminish competition, not by offering a 
better product in any sense of the word, but by increasing 
operating expenses for its rivals.110  Early advocates of this 
framework focused upon two legitimate theories of RRC: 
(1) foreclosing supply, and (2) inducing collusion.111  The first 
theory relates to a predator’s acquisition of an exclusionary 
right—such as an exclusive dealing contract—over a portion of 
supply such that competitors are foreclosed from achieving 
minimum efficient scale—that is, the scale necessary to remain 
competitively effective.112  The second acknowledges that 
exclusionary vertical restraints may, under certain conditions, 
facilitate pricing coordination that benefits the colluding 
suppliers while raising costs to the purchaser’s non-colluding 
competitors.113  Under RRC theory, the dominant firm need 
neither to set unprofitable prices for itself in the first time period 
nor to recoup these losses in any subsequent period.114  Thus, 
from the outset, the RRC framework posits a view of exclusionary 
conduct that is both profitable for the dominant firm and harmful 
to consumers.115  It also considers that such conduct may occur 
along numerous, non-price dimensions, such as by foreclosing 
rivals from access to inputs or customers.116 
The insight underlying the RRC approach was that, if 
conduct by a dominant firm impaired rivals’ abilities to compete 
to such an extent that the rivals could no longer constrain the 
defendant’s market power, that lack of constraint constituted a 
potentially serious problem.117  The result would be increased 
prices to consumers, diminished innovation, lower quality, fewer 
services, and so forth.118  Post-Chicago analysis, similar to 
Chicago analysis, thus recognizes the value of competitors—but 
only to the extent that the competitors protect consumers.  
 
110 Salop & Scheffman, supra note 109. 
111 Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 109, at 236–42. 
112 Id. at 236–38. 
113 Id. at 238. 
114 Raising Rivals’ Costs, supra note 109, at 267. 
115 Id. at 268, 270. 
116 Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 109, at 224. 
117 Id. 
118 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES 2 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-
2010.html; see also Daniel Rockower, Antitrust Implications of the Comcast-Time 
Warner Cable Merger, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (Apr. 11, 2014, 4:04 PM), available at 
http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/13011. 
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Today, the general consensus seems to be that the RRC 
framework is more useful for evaluating most forms of 
exclusionary conduct than the predation framework.119 
The courts have likewise recognized the value of viewing 
cases through the post-Chicago lens.  In 1992, the Supreme Court 
recognized the importance of information costs in upholding a 
plaintiff’s unlawful tying claim in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image 
Technical Services, Inc.120  Since then, economic foreclosure, as 
developed by post-Chicago analysts, has become a focal point in 
many cases.  For instance, in United States v. Microsoft Corp.,121 
the D.C. Circuit evaluated allegations that Microsoft’s exclusive 
dealing contracts with computer manufacturers and Internet 
access providers (“IAPs”) foreclosed competitor web browsers 
from efficient access to consumers.122  Under these exclusive 
contracts, computer manufacturers were not permitted to remove 
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer icon from their computers’ 
desktops, and IAPs, such as AOL, were not permitted to promote 
non-Microsoft browsers or to supply more than fifteen percent of 
their subscribers with such browsers.123  Because computer 
manufacturers and IAPs were the most cost-effective channels by 
which browsers could reach consumers, and because Microsoft 
had such exclusive contracts with fourteen of the fifteen largest 
IAPs, the court held Microsoft had unlawfully exploited its 
monopoly power to foreclose its rivals and to prevent them from 
challenging its monopolistic advantage.124 
 
119 See Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 261, 288 n.147, 339 n.418 (2010) (citing cases criticizing predation issues); 
Wright, supra note 109, at 1163. The major exceptions are predatory pricing and 
refusals to deal. See also infra text accompanying notes 195, 200. 
120 504 U.S. 451, 486 (1992). 
121 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
122 Id. at 45. 
123 Id. at 60–61, 68. 
124 Id. at 64 (“[W]e hold that . . . all the OEM license restrictions at issue 
represent uses of Microsoft’s market power to protect its monopoly . . . .”); id. at 71 
(“By ensuring that the ‘majority’ of all IAP subscribers are offered [Internet 
Explorer] either as the default browser or as the only browser, Microsoft’s deals with 
the IAPs clearly have a significant effect in preserving its monopoly; they help keep 
usage of Navigator below the critical level necessary for Navigator or any other rival 
to pose a real threat to Microsoft’s monopoly.”). 
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V. WHERE ARE WE TODAY? 
While much of the fall-out from the antitrust overhaul 
beginning in the 1970s has settled, and antitrust today is 
comparatively more stable, several significant questions remain 
regarding how antitrust courts, scholars, and lawyers can and 
should analyze various allegedly anticompetitive conducts.  Many 
of these concerns have become especially pronounced as the 
economy shifts to rely increasingly upon high-technology 
industries, whose markets and behaviors are dynamic and often 
novel.  The desire for antitrust to provide clearer rules and 
guidelines grows commensurately with these market changes 
and concerns, but such clarity has yet to come to fruition. 
It is certain, however, that the tradition of outright hostility 
to firms with monopoly power eroded with Brooke Group and 
Matsushita, and was fully shed by the Supreme Court in its 2004 
decision of Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis 
V. Trinko, LLP.125  In Trinko, the Court held that the “mere 
possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of 
monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important 
element of the free-market system.”126  That Court went on to 
explain that the “opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least 
for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first 
place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and 
economic growth.”127  Indeed, the Court not only refrained from 
displaying hostility towards monopolies generally, but, in fact, 
condoned them to the extent their benefits incentivize firms to 
offer enhanced products and to endeavor to satisfy unmet 
consumer needs.128  Trinko, moreover, cautioned that courts 
should be wary of erroneously condemning allegedly exclusionary 
conduct, noting that “[m]istaken inferences and the resulting 






125 540 U.S. 398, 415–16 (2004). 
126 Id. at 407. 
127 Id. 
128 In subsequent cases, the Court has continued to recognize this value deriving 
from monopoly rewards. See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 
438, 454–55 (2009). 
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very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’  The cost 
of false positives counsels against undue expansion of § 2 
liability.”129 
The courts have also recognized that analysis of whether 
conduct harms the competitive process cannot be based solely on 
the defendant’s conduct.  The analysis must also include an 
inquiry into the complainant’s ability to overcome the challenged 
practice through countermeasures of its own.  When doing so is 
not unduly difficult, the effect of the challenged practice may well 
be to enhance competition.130 
While these recognitions are insightful and offer some 
guidance, we are far from complete cohesion in exclusionary 
conduct analysis.  Many seemingly pre-antitrust revolution 
claims have survived.  For instance, in West Penn Allegheny 
Health System v. UPMC,131 the appellate court sustained a claim 
that a vertical agreement harmed competition by providing the 
defendant with more favorable treatment, causing the plaintiff to 
receive less advantageous reimbursement rates,132 and that 
purportedly false statements about the plaintiff caused it “to pay 
artificially inflated financing costs” on debt held by sophisticated 
Wall Street investors.133  Other courts have cited Alcoa as stating 
the basic rule for monopolization, appearing even to rely upon 
Alcoa’s conception that “no monopolist monopolizes unconscious 
of what he is doing.”134 
 
129 540 U.S. at 414 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)); see also Linkline, 555 U.S. at 451 (also quoting 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 136–37 
(1998); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 728 (1998); Spectrum 
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456, 458 (1993) (“[T]his Court and other 
courts have been careful to avoid constructions of § 2 which might chill competition, 
rather than foster it.”); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594 (noting that incorrect incorrectly 
identifying conduct as predatory pricing is “especially costly because [it] chill[s] the 
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect”). 
130 See, e.g., NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 452, 455 (6th Cir. 2007). 
131 627 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
132 Id. at 105. But see Monahan’s Marine v. Bos. Whaler, Inc., 866 F.2d 525, 527 
(1st Cir. 1989). 
133 W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., 627 F.3d at 110. But see Sanderson v. 
Culligan Int’l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 623–24 (7th Cir. 2005). 
134 LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Some recent agency cases, such as the FTC’s case against McWane, 
Inc., currently on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, No. 14-11363, have likewise been 
criticized for employing pre-revolution theory and analysis. See Opinion of the 
Commission, McWane, Inc., Docket No. 9351 (F.T.C. Feb. 6, 2014), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140206mcwaneopinion_0.pdf; 
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The cases today, accordingly, provide no consistent, thorough 
approach for evaluating allegedly exclusionary conduct.  
Although the beginnings of rules have started to emerge for 
specific types of conduct, not even these rules are yet clear, aside 
from the below-cost pricing rule for predatory pricing.  The 
antitrust agencies have been concerned enough with this opaque 
state of play to hold hearings in both 2006 and 2014 surrounding 
the issue of how antitrust should approach various allegedly 
exclusionary behaviors.135  Following the agencies’ 2006 to 2007 
hearings, the U.S. Department of Justice issued its “Section 2 
Report,”136 which sought “to make progress toward the goal of 
developing sound, clear, objective, effective and administrable 
standards for Section 2 analysis.”137  While this Report was 
intended to clarify the agencies’ approach to section 2, it was 
quite controversial—with the Federal Trade Commission 
refusing to join—and was withdrawn just a few months after 
being issued.138  One important reason for its ultimate revocation 
is that, according to many, the Report attempted to over-simplify 
section 2 enforcement by fitting most, if not all, allegedly 
exclusionary conduct into a variant of the Brooke Group  
price-cost framework.139  But exclusionary conduct can manifest 
 
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, McWane, Inc., Docket No. 
9351 (F.T.C. Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
public_statements/202211/140206mcwanestatement.pdf. Others have vigorously 
defended the result. See Steven C. Salop, Economic and Legal Analysis of Exclusive 
Dealing by Monopolists: A Decision-Theoretic Approach (forthcoming 2015). 
135 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC DOJ Seek Comments for Upcoming 
Hearings on Single-Firm Conduct (Mar. 30, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
news-events/press-releases/2006/03/ftc-doj-seek-comments-upcoming-hearings-single 
-firm-conduct; Conditional Pricing Practices: Economic Analysis and Legal Policy 
Implications: An FTC-DOJ Workshop (June 23, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/events-calendar/2014/06/conditional-pricing-practices-economic-analysis-legal 
-policy. 
136 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM 
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ atr/public/reports/236681.pdf. 
137 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Issues Report on 
Antitrust Monopoly Law 1–2 (Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/public/press_releases/2008/236975.pdf. 
138 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report 
on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm. 
139 See, e.g., id.; Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Commissioners Harbour, 
Leibowitz & Rosch on the Issuance of the Section 2 Report by the Department of 
Justice (Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
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in many ways that are not properly captured by a price-cost test.  
The Report thus left many unsatisfied and ill at ease—and left 
open the question of what rule or rules to apply in exclusionary 
conduct cases. 
With unclear, and at times conflicting, guidance and 
opinions seeming to abound, the question then arises of what is 
an exclusionary conduct defendant or plaintiff to do? 
VI. EMERGENCE OF A FLEXIBLE EQUALLY EFFICIENT RIVAL 
APPROACH 
It is widely recognized that distinguishing pro and 
anticompetitive conduct is a fundamental and significant hurdle 
for antitrust factfinders, and, as discussed, exclusionary conduct 
has proven to be a particularly thorny arena.140  It is equally well 
recognized that efforts to find a one-size-fits-all standard for all 
aspects of exclusionary conduct have failed, and that different 
types of conduct require their own assessments.141 
To assist in the tricky endeavor of identifying the conduct 
that crosses the line, antitrust law often seeks to create screens 
for ascertaining at an early stage whether particular conduct 
poses a serious risk of harming consumers.142  Several factors 
must be taken into account in designing any such screen, 
including: (1) what economic theory instructs may be the 
particular adverse consequences arising the type of conduct in 
issue; (2) what empirical evidence suggests regarding how often 
the conduct will yield undesirable outcomes; and (3) the capacity 
of the fact finder—be it an agency, a judge, or a jury—to 
understand and properly distinguish between procompetitive and 
anticompetitive conduct.  Bearing these considerations in mind, a 
useful way to evaluate many forms of allegedly exclusionary 
conduct, especially given current economic understanding, is to 
determine whether the conduct passes a flexible equally efficient 
rival screen.  The question posed is whether a hypothetical rival, 




140 See supra Part V. 
141 See, e.g., Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the 
Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 
ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 437 (2006). 
142 This is exemplified, perhaps most prominently, in the below-cost pricing 
requirement for predatory pricing. 
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profitably meet or better the defendant’s sales offer; if so, that 
offer should not be deemed exclusionary.  This screen thus 
changes the focus of the analysis from one directed solely at the 
conduct of the defendant to one that also considers the real effect 
on the plaintiff—to determine whether there is true exclusion or 
whether the conduct is better characterized as creating an 
incentive for the plaintiff to dig down and compete more 
effectively. 
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that this 
equally efficient rival analysis provides an effective safe harbor, 
not a test of illegality.  Prices or other offers that could not be 
met on this basis would not necessarily be unlawful; rather, 
further analysis would be required to discern whether the effect 
of the conduct would increase, protect, or maintain the 
defendant’s market power.  But conduct that an efficient rival 
could counter effectively would be deemed not exclusionary or 
otherwise unlawful.  The test should, in other words, rule out the 
possibility that exclusion is occurring based upon the competitive 
merits.  In doing so, the test seeks to ensure that rivals have an 
equal opportunity to compete for the business in issue.  
Competition at this stage is often a significant driver of consumer 
benefits, and preserving competition for the contract is, 
accordingly, a high priority in antitrust law.143  The equally 
efficient rival approach is designed to balance the desire to avoid 
punishing competitively beneficial conduct against the need to 
prevent firms from employing facially beneficial practices to 
maintain or otherwise exploit their monopoly power.  
Simultaneously, as developed below, this test remains relatively 
administrable while being nuanced enough to respond to 
differing economic considerations in various types of, but not all, 
exclusion cases. 
The equally efficient rival test, moreover, finds considerable 
support in both academia and case law.  Prominent antitrust 
scholars have endorsed the equally efficient rival test.  Judge 
Posner, for example, contends that a monopolist’s conduct should 
be deemed exclusionary if “the challenged practice is likely in the 
 
143 The seminal case on this point is Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Paddock 
Publications v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42 (7th Cir. 1996). On the economic 
origins, see Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968); 
Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies—in General and 
with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976). 
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circumstances to exclude from the defendant’s market an equally 
or more efficient competitor.”144  Areeda and Hovenkamp 
similarly support this approach, arguing that “[a]ctionable 
exclusion requires a showing not merely that a particular rival 
cannot compete effectively, but that no equally efficient rival 
can.”145  Some courts have likewise acknowledged the utility of 
the equally efficient rival approach.  The Ninth Circuit, for 
instance, has adopted a test for bundled discounting cases that 
“ensures that the only bundled discounts condemned as 
exclusionary are those that would exclude an equally efficient 
producer of the competitive product or products.”146  The 
European Commission has also endorsed this test, noting that 
“the Commission will normally only intervene where the conduct 
concerned has already been or is capable of hampering 
competition from competitors which are considered to be as 
efficient as the dominant undertaking.”147 
It is unsurprising that the equally efficient rival test has 
experienced a certain level of success.  In recent years, antitrust 
law has shifted to focus much more heavily upon the competitive 
effects of allegedly anticompetitive conduct, as opposed to 
indirect methods of inferring that certain conduct is or is not 
anticompetitive,148 and the equally efficient rival test functionally 
 
144 POSNER, supra note 76, at 194–95. 
145 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 749a (3d ed. 
2008). 
146 Cascade Health Solutions v. Peacehealth, 515 F.3d 883, 909 (9th Cir. 2008); 
see also Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The question, therefore, is whether a firm that enjoys a monopoly 
on one or more of a group of complementary products, but which faces competition 
on others, can price all of its products above average variable cost and yet still drive 
an equally efficient competitor out of the market. The answer to this question seems 
to be that it can . . . .”); infra Part VII.B (providing a fuller discussion of this case). 
But see Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, at 10, In re 
Intel Corp., Docket No. 9341 (FTC File No. 061 0247) (Aug. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/08/100804intelanal_0.pdf 
(the Commission expressly noted the proposed consent did “not reflect an 
endorsement or adoption” of an equally efficient rival test like that espoused in 
Peacehealth). 
147 Communication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s 
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings February 2009, art. 2, 2009 O.J. 
(C 45) 7, 11, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ 
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01)&from=EN [hereinafter EC Guidance Paper]. 
148 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
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hones in on what the excluded rival can and should do to 
compete.  It is advantageous in that it is not an exclusively  
price-cost based, or “Brooke Group,” approach; such approaches 
often distract from the actual competitive effects analysis by 
focusing, somewhat myopically, upon whether the conduct entails 
lost profits that are likely later to be recouped—a focus inapt for 
the many varieties of conduct that are both immediately 
profitable and exclusionary.149  That is, price-cost based tests are 
more adept at analyzing conduct that involves a short-term 
sacrifice of profitability with an expectation that the profits will 
be recovered once rival competition has been removed.  They are 
much less appropriate in evaluating methods of exclusion that 
rely on methods of foreclosure that are also profitable in the 
short term. 
The equally efficient rival approach has a fundamentally 
closer nexus with the RRC framework.  This approach asks 
whether, notwithstanding the defendant’s conduct, rivals of 
equal efficiency could implement counterstrategies allowing them 
profitably to compete for the business; that is, whether by doing 
so rivals could achieve minimum efficient scale, which is the 
concern inherent in the RRC framework.150  If such competition 
would not be profitable, the focus then shifts to discerning why it 
is not.  At this stage, this approach allows the fact finder to 
examine whether it is the defendant’s superior efficiency or 
something else—possibly something malevolent151—that, in 
practice, renders competition infeasible.  Antitrust law endeavors 
to proscribe conduct by a monopolist that prevents competitors 
from disciplining its monopoly power, and the equally efficient 
rival test seeks to ascertain whether such prevention is in fact 
occurring by identifying in the first instance where it can be said 
that is clearly not.  In doing so, the test acknowledges and 
attempts to account for the types of harms RRC theories proffer. 
 
files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf (“The measurement of market 
shares and market concentration is not an end in itself, but is useful to the extent it 
illuminates the merger’s likely competitive effects.”). 
149 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Jacobson & Scott A. Sher, “No Economic Sense” Makes 
No Sense for Exclusive Dealing, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 779, 780–81 (2006). 
150 See Joanna Warren, LePage’s v. 3M: An Antitrust Analysis of Loyalty 
Rebates, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1605, 1622 (2004). 
151 See Telex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927 (10th Cir. 1975) 
(“The term [‘predatory’] probably does not have a well-defined meaning in the 
context it was used, but it certainly bears a sinister connotation.”). 
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While the equally efficient rival test offers numerous 
benefits, it is far from perfect.  Less efficient rivals can often 
compete and generate lower prices or higher output for 
consumers.152  By injecting even a modicum of more competition 
into the market, less efficient competitors may be able to make 
consumers somewhat better off.153  Against this potential benefit, 
however, the cost to businesses of increased antitrust exposure 
and uncertainty must be weighed.  Is the plaintiff really 
constrained from competing, or is its failure just a product of its 
less efficient cost structure or, worse, a desire to maintain high 
profit margins?  Businesses need some standard by which to 
judge what they can and cannot do.  Without any concrete 
standard, antitrust can pose unwarranted risks of chilling 
significant amounts of procompetitive conduct.  Businesses are 
likely to stay far afield from conduct that puts them at risk for 
treble damages and follow-on lawsuits, refusing to engage even 
in procompetitive conduct that might put it at risk, and the 
potential increase in competition deriving from the continued 
existence of a less efficient rival may very well be overwhelmed 
by the diminished competition along other dimensions.  
Especially when the allegedly harmful conduct involves 
discounting or implicates a firm’s ability to compete for all or 
part of a contract, antitrust law must tread carefully.  A blunt 
approach in these areas threatens to dampen competition in the 
long run and to raise prices to consumers even more than the 
supposedly anticompetitive conduct. 
At the same time, flexibility and common sense are 
necessary.154  Analysis of the rival’s effectiveness need not be 
based upon pure price-cost determinations but, rather, should be 
flexible enough to conform to the facts of the case at hand.  
Where a new entrant, for example, may not be equally efficient 
today but is likely to become as efficient in the reasonably 
foreseeable future, exclusion of the entrant is likely to harm 
 
152 EC Guidance Paper, supra note 147, ¶ 24; Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary 
Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 
ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 328 (2006). 
153 See Jennifer E. Sturiale, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property as 
Merger Remedy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 72 LA. L. REV. 605, 610 (2012). 
154 This flexibility extends both to the initial, screening application of the 
equally efficient rival approach, and to subsequent conduct-specific analysis under 
the full rule of reason for those cases that fail the first screen. 
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consumers.155  The focus on the entrant’s ability to compete, 
therefore, should be forward-looking and take into consideration 
the entrant’s likely efficiency, in the absence of exclusion, over 
the next few years.156  Similarly, where costs are relevant, the 
analysis needs to account for those types of products, such as 
drugs or software, where incremental costs are very low but 
where upfront investments may be quite high; this disparity in 
cost allocation could theoretically allow a firm to price above 
incremental cost but well below the cost at which an equally 
efficient rival could effectively compete, due, for instance, to the 
rival’s more recent entry and need to cover a greater portion of 
its upfront costs in its sales price. 
This flexibility, while essential to protect the competitive 
process, necessarily injects some additional uncertainty into the 
analysis.  Still, application of this kind of flexible equally efficient 
rival analysis should allow firms to plan and compete effectively.  
The ultimate focus is whether the rival could, if it elected to 
compete effectively, take steps to gain the business—or sufficient 
business—in issue.  If the rival can cut its prices or otherwise 
defeat the threatened foreclosure, the conduct should not be 
unlawful.  If it cannot do so because of an inefficient cost 
structure or other factors for which the defendant is not 
responsible, it similarly should have no claim.  But if the practice 
in question would prevent an equally efficient rival from 
competing effectively to constrain the defendant’s market, and is 
not offset by sufficient consumer benefits, the rival’s case should 
be allowed to proceed.  Dominant firms and their counsel should 
be able to analyze these factors well enough to separate the safe 
from the unduly dangerous.157  The essence of the antitrust point 
 
155 See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 109, at 269; Thomas A. Piraino, An 
Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly Leveraging by Electronic Networks, 93 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1, 32–33 (1999). 
156 See Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts To Drive Out Entrants Are 
Not Predatory—and the Implications for Defining Costs and Marked Power, 112 
YALE L.J. 681, 755 (2003). 
157 Justice Brandeis’s famous observation is apt: 
I have been asked many times as regard to particular practices or 
agreements as to whether they were legal or illegal under the Sherman 
[antitrust] law. One gentleman said to me: ‘We do not know where we can 
go.’ To which I replied: ‘I think your lawyers . . . can tell you where a fairly 
safe course lies. If you are walking along a precipice no human being can 
tell you how near you can go to that precipice without falling over, because 
you may stumble on a loose stone, . . . but [the lawyer] can tell you where 
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is that a plaintiff who can compete should—and a plaintiff that 
cannot compete effectively due to its own inefficiency, or 
unwillingness, should not be able to advance a cognizable 
claim.158 
VII. APPLICATION IN PRACTICE 
This analysis can be applied to many variants of allegedly 
exclusionary conduct, including exclusive dealing, bundling, 
loyalty discounts, and tying: but it is not a panacea.  The types of 
practices with exclusionary potential are many and varied, with 
different effects and with widely varying implications for 
dominant firm incentives.  Efforts to develop an overall test for 
dominant firm conduct have therefore proven elusive.159  We set 
forth here some of the variants of dominant firm conduct that are 
often challenged to see where—and how—equally efficient rival 
analysis can be applied, and where it cannot. 
A. Exclusive Dealing 
The equally efficient rival test proves especially beneficial in 
instances such as exclusive dealing where the allegedly 
exclusionary conduct only rarely raises legitimate competitive 
concerns, but where, when present, such concerns can be quite 
serious.160  It is well-recognized that numerous procompetitive 
benefits are associated with most exclusive arrangements—these 
arrangements often make distribution more effective by 
increasing dedication and loyalty, minimizing free-riding, 
improving product quality, and providing customers and 
 
you can walk perfectly safe within convenient distance of that precipice.’ 
The difficulty which men have felt . . . has been rather that they wanted to 
go to the limit rather than that they have wanted to go safely. 
Hearings on S. Res. No. 98 Before the Sen. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62d Cong. 
1161 (1911). 
158 Courts have, indeed, recognized this very point. See, e.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. 
Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 281 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing that unlawful foreclosure 
may occur when competitors are “driven out . . . because they are never given an 
opportunity to compete, despite their ability to offer products with significant 
customer demand”); Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 
592 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding competitors were not foreclosed “because 
‘a competing manufacturer need[ed] only offer a better product or a . . . better deal to 
acquire [a customer’s business]’ ”). 
159 See Popofsky, supra note 141, at 435–36. 
160 See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
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suppliers with a reliable supply source.161  Under certain 
circumstances, however, exclusivity can lock a plaintiff out and 
raise rivals costs in a manner that enhances the defendant’s 
market power, without commensurate consumer benefits.  
Distinguishing between these two scenarios is critical, and the 
flexible equally efficient rival test provides a workable 
mechanism for doing so. 
The screen we would suggest is relatively clear for exclusive 
dealing:  A plaintiff who can either break the exclusivity with an 
equally attractive offer of its own or otherwise effectively compete 
for sufficient business such that it continues to constrain the 
defendant’s market power should not be allowed to recover.  This 
screen recognizes that most exclusive dealing cases today are 
based upon RRC theories, which posit that a defendant may be 
anti-competitively excluding a rival using non-price foreclosure 
mechanisms.162  Indeed, substantial foreclosure is a necessary 
condition in any exclusive dealing case:  The plaintiff must 
demonstrate that it was blocked or impeded from either sufficient 
volume or a critical input so as to prevent it from meeting 
minimum efficient scale or otherwise competing effectively, and 
that this impairment of rivals contributed materially to the 
defendant’s acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power. 
A focus solely upon the percentage of the market covered by 
the arrangements, however, is inappropriate.  This is especially 
true given the ease with which market definitions and 
foreclosure percentages can be manipulated.  Reliance simply on 
numbers often obscures an analysis of actual competitive effects 
in favor of a more formalistic reliance upon the percentage of 
contracts covered by the exclusionary agreements alone, often 
without any accounting for the competitive realities surrounding 
 
161 See, e.g., Alden F. Abbott & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Analysis of Tying 
Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing, in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 183 
(Keith N. Hylton ed., 2010); Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, “Foreclosure,” 
and Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 357–60 (2002); Joshua D. Wright, 
Commissioner, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks Made at the Bates White 10th 
Annual Antitrust Conference, Simple but Wrong or Complex but More Accurate? 
The Case for an Exclusive Dealing-Based Approach to Evaluating Loyalty Discounts 
(June 3, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
public_statements/simple-wrong-or-complex-more-accurate-case-exclusive-dealing-
based-approach-evaluating-loyalty/130603bateswhite.pdf. 
162 Indeed, as discussed, a defendant may be pricing above cost but still 
excluding a competitor to the detriment of competition and consumers. See 
Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 109, at 243. 
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the agreements, such as what percentage of the volume the 
defendant would have supplied even absent the exclusive 
component.163 
Instead of looking solely to numeric percentages, the focus 
ought to be upon whether, in fact, the arrangement is such that 
an efficient rival is so impaired that it can no longer compete 
effectively.  If, for instance, an efficient competitor could offer the 
same or a better deal than the defendant without enticing any 
customers away because of the defendant’s arrangements, the 
likelihood the defendant is behaving in an exclusionary fashion is 
higher. 
Courts have recognized and applied this reasoning in two 
notable recent cases, NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co.164 and Eisai Inc. v. 
Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC.165  In NicSand, the court affirmed a 
dismissal of NicSand’s exclusive dealing claims after concluding 
NicSand’s loss of market share to 3M stemmed from its refusal to 
engage in the vigorous competition required to satisfy consumers’ 
expectations.166  Between 1987 and 2001, NicSand and 3M were 
the only nationwide suppliers of do-it-yourself automotive 
sandpaper, a market in which six large retail purchasers 
accounted for eighty percent of the market and in which five of 
these retailers offered their shelf space on an exclusive basis for 
one year at a time.167  At its peak, NicSand commanded a sixty-
seven percent market share, but rapidly lost standing to 3M 
between 1997 and 2001. 
After experiencing this loss of prominence, NicSand brought 
an antitrust suit against 3M.  NicSand premised its claims upon 
three of 3M’s competitive strategies:  (1) The up-front payments 
that 3M offered to the four retailers that switched from NicSand 
 
163 If, for example, a defendant’s exclusive agreements cover eighty percent of a 
market, but it would have supplied seventy-five percent even if it did not offer an 
exclusive arrangement, then the effect of the exclusive component is to prevent 
rivals from accessing that additional five percent of the market; courts, however, 
would typically calculate the percentage foreclosure in this example as eighty 
percent without further inquiry. See Wright, supra note 109, at 1182–83, 1185 
(analyzing cases in which courts have misused the “substantial foreclosure” screen 
and proffering a “but-for foreclosure” measurement that accounts for the volume a 
defendant would have absent any exclusive arrangement and would more accurately 
reflect the competitive effects of exclusive agreements at issue). 
164 507 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2007). 
165 No. 08-4168 (MLC), 2014 WL 1343254 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2014). 
166 507 F.3d at 447. 
167 Id. 
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to 3M; (2) the multi-year terms of the agreements between 3M 
and the retailers; and (3) the exclusive nature of these 
agreements.168  The court found each of these grounds meritless.  
First, the court noted that, even accounting for the up-front 
payments, NicSand conceded that 3M did not engage in any 
predatory pricing, and, moreover, that retailers routinely 
demanded such payments before switching suppliers.  Second, 
the court found 3M merely offered—but did not require—multi-
year contracts, and that the retailers were able to insist upon 
lower prices in exchange for these longer contracts.  Indeed, the 
court observed that “[h]aving previously paid NicSand prices 
generating 38-49% profits margins, the large retailers cannot be 
blamed for accepting better prices with 3M for several years, not 
just one.”169 
Finally, turning to the exclusive nature of the agreements at 
issue, the court held “NicSand has not claimed—and cannot 
tenably claim—that it suffered . . . anticompetitive effects” 
deriving from the exclusive contracts.170  The court noted, again, 
that the exclusive nature of the agreements was something the 
retailers insisted upon, not something 3M forced upon them.  The 
court continued to find that “NicSand offer[ed] no explanation 
why it could not compete for these multi-year agreements nor 
why (in view of its high margins) it could not match 3M’s 
discounts.”171  Quite to the contrary, the court found “NicSand 
had every opportunity to compete and yet it failed to do so.”172  
Accordingly, the court dismissed NicSand’s claims. 
Similarly, in Eisai, the court held Eisai’s antitrust claims 
could not withstand an exclusive-dealing analysis because the 
court believed there was no evidence Eisai was precluded from 
competing for the contracts.173  Both Eisai and Sanofi 
manufactured competing anticoagulant drug products, Fragmin 
and Lovenox, respectively.174  Eisai contended Sanofi’s loyalty 
 
168 Id. at 451. 
169 Id. at 453. 
170 Id. at 454. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, No. 08-4168 (MLC), 2014 WL 
1343254, at *31 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2014). As a disclaimer, Mr. Jacobson represented 
Eisai at the motion to dismiss stage of proceedings in this case. Nothing in this 
paper should be taken as representing the views of Eisai or any party to the case. 
174 Id. at *1. 
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discounts program constituted unlawful exclusionary conduct 
under an exclusive dealing theory because it was foreclosed from 
sixty-eight percent to eighty-four percent of the market and 
because “more hospitals would have switched to Fragmin . . . if 
not for the Lovenox Program[.]”175  The court, however, concluded 
on summary judgment that no unlawful foreclosure occurred, 
noting that record evidence indicated “Eisai could, and at times 
did, compete more vigorously to increase its market share,” and 
that, when Eisai did “compete[] more aggressively by offering 
greater discounts, it won more business.”176  Indeed, the court 
found both Fragmin’s and another competitor’s drugs gained 
market share during the period of allegedly anticompetitive 
conduct, thereby indicating “that customers could walk away 
from the Lovenox discounts when they so desired, and they 
did.”177  Here again, the court focused upon whether the plaintiff 
could compete, and its holding hinged upon the finding that Eisai 
could do, and at times did do, just that. 
NicSand and Eisai provide examples of how the flexible 
equally efficient rival test can operate in practice.  In each case, 
the court inquired whether the plaintiff was capable of competing 
for the contracts, analyzing the allegations and the facts to 
determine, fundamentally, what was being argued and what was 
actually occurring.  The courts determined that, in each instance, 
the plaintiff proffered no reason why it could not have competed 





175 Id. at *32. 
176 Id. at *33–34. 
177 Id. at *34. Moreover, the court then noted its holding was consistent with the 
approach taken in other circuits under similar facts. It cited the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Group LP, 592 
F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2010), for the proposition that competitors are not foreclosed 
when “a competing manufacturer need[] only offer a better product or a . . . better 
deal to acquire [a customer’s business]”; the Eighth Circuit’s Concord Boat Corp. v. 
Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000), opinion, finding 
competitors are not unlawfully excluded when customers are “ ‘free to walk away’ 
from the discounts and [they] d[o] in fact walk away when competitors offer[] better 
discounts”; and the Sixth Circuit’s NicSand opinion and concluded these cases 
demonstrate “that, in general, antitrust claims fail if customers are able to walk 
away from the defendant’s discounts and still use the defendant as a supplier.” 
Eisai, 2014 WL 1343254, at *34–36. 
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concluded that NicSand and Eisai were both capable of offering 
more competitive terms but had opted not to and should not be 
rewarded for refusing to engage in competitive behavior.178 
B. Bundling 
Bundling presents a somewhat easier, at least in principle, 
application of the equally efficient rival test.  Bundling occurs 
when a discount is conditioned on the buyer’s agreement to 
purchase two or more products from the same seller and is 
pervasive in the modern economy.  While it is often a means of 
price competition with the corresponding consumer benefits, 
under a RRC theory, bundling can deprive equally or more 
efficient single-product rivals of the volume needed to achieve 
economies of scale.  In such circumstances, rivals’ ability to 
constrain the multi-product defendant’s market power may be 
impaired and consumers may be harmed both by the potential 
reduction of competition in the competitive product market and 
by the reinforcement of barriers to entry in the monopoly product 
market. 
Courts and scholars have made substantial strides in 
applying the equally efficient rival test to bundled discounting.179  
Much of this progress followed the heavily criticized opinion in 
LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M,180 which itself referenced the equally 
efficient rival test, but proceeded, misguidedly, to focus primarily 
upon harm to competitors rather than harm to consumers.181  The 
LePage’s court held a jury can reasonably conclude that a multi-
product firm with monopoly power in a relevant product market 
 
178 Other cases have similarly concluded exclusive arrangements were not 
anticompetitive when the plaintiff had the opportunity and ability to compete for 
volume. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 
362, 391 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (“Because Retail Leaders agreements are terminable at 
will with thirty days’ notice, retail product and display space are subject to 
uninterrupted competitive bidding, and Plaintiffs are not substantially foreclosed 
from the relevant market.”), aff’d, 67 F. App’x 810 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Joshua D. 
Wright, Antitrust Law and Competition for Distribution, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 169 
(2006). 
179 See, e.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 903–04 
(9th Cir. 2008); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 145, ¶ 749a; POSNER, supra note 
76, at 236; ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
(2007) [hereinafter AMC REPORT], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ 
amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf. 
180 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003). 
181 Id. at 161. 
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violates the antitrust laws when it bundles that product with 
another, competitive product in order to expand its share of the 
competitive product market.182  This holding essentially premised 
liability upon the plaintiff’s inability to offer as comprehensive a 
product set, and not upon the ultimate consumer welfare effect 
and effectively offered no actual test or any limiting principle.183 
The subsequent discussion and critiques identified the 
analytical shortcomings of LePage’s and led to important steps 
forward, as exemplified in the recommendations of the Antitrust 
Modernization Commission184 (“AMC”) and in Cascade Health 
Solutions v. Peacehealth.185  The AMC proffered a three-factored 
test for assessing bundled discounts:  (1) After allocating all 
discounts and rebates attributable to the entire bundle of 
products to the competitive product, the defendant sold the 
competitive product below its incremental cost for the 
competitive product; (2) the defendant is likely to recoup these 
short-term losses, either simultaneously or later on; and (3) the 
bundled discount has had or is likely to have an adverse effect on 
competition.186  This test represents an application of the equally 
efficient rival approach to bundling—it is a screen designed to 
dispose of those instances in which unlawful exclusionary 
conduct is not occurring by asking whether a rival of equal 
efficiency could offer the product at the same price.  Only a less 
efficient rival would be negatively impacted by the multi-product 
firm’s bundling if the price of the product remained above cost 
even after attributing all discounts to that product.  And only if a 
bundle fails this test would the case proceed to analyzing the 
competitive effects of the bundle. 
The Ninth Circuit in PeaceHealth employed a similar 
approach when presented with a bundled discount case.  The 
plaintiff in PeaceHealth, McKenzie, offered only primary and 
secondary hospital care, while the defendant, PeaceHealth, 
offered primary, secondary, and tertiary care.  McKenzie 
contended PeaceHealth engaged in unlawful bundling by offering 
insurers additional discounts of up to thirty-five to forty percent 
 
182 Id. at 161–62. 
183 See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exploring the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission’s Proposed Test for Bundled Pricing, 21 ANTITRUST 23, 24 (2007). 
184 AMC REPORT, supra note 179. 
185 515 F.3d 883, 889 (9th Cir. 2008). 
186 Id. at 900. 
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if the insurer made PeaceHealth its only preferred provider for 
all three levels of care.  In analyzing these allegations, the Ninth 
Circuit declined to follow the Third Circuit’s LePage’s approach, 
given “the endemic nature of bundled discounts in many spheres 
of normal economic activity.”187  Likewise, it declined to apply a 
full Brooke Group analysis, which would apply an “aggregate 
discount” rule and find the bundle unlawful only if the 
discounted price of the entire bundle were below the bundling 
firm’s incremental cost of producing the entire bundle.188  In 
doing so, the court recognized: 
[B]undled discounts present one potential threat to consumer 
welfare that single product discounts do not:  A competitor who 
produces fewer products than the defendant but produces the 
competitive product at or below the defendant’s cost to produce 
that product may nevertheless be excluded from the market 
because the competitor cannot match the discount the 
defendant offers over its numerous product lines.189 
Instead, the court held a test based upon the equally efficient 
rival approach was appropriate: 
[A] plaintiff who challenges a package discount as 
anticompetitive must prove that, when the full amount of the 
discounts given by the defendant is allocated to the competitive 
product or products, the resulting price of the competitive 
product or products is below the defendant’s incremental cost to 
produce them.  This requirement ensures that the only bundled 
discounts condemned as exclusionary are those that would 
exclude an equally efficient producer of the competitive product 
or products.190 
Accordingly, case law and commentary have demonstrated 
that an equally efficient rival approach to bundling is both 
analytically sound, given current economics, and an effective 
screen in practice.  Moreover, this approach strikes a nice 
balance between the unacceptably vague and overbroad LePage’s 
test and the unacceptably narrow full Brooke Group variant of 
per se legality. 
 
187 Id. at 903. 
188 Id. at 904. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 909. 
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C. Loyalty Discounts 
Application of the equally efficient rival test to loyalty 
discounts, on the other hand, is rather more complex.  Loyalty 
discounts reward consumers for purchasing more from the same 
supplier; such discounts come in different forms:  For example, if 
a consumer purchases a certain minimum amount of product, he 
may be rewarded by paying a lower price for each unit going 
forward or the discount might “revert back” to the first units 
purchased and the consumer given a “rebate” on those units.191 
For loyalty discounts, then, attributing all the relevant 
discounts to the “competitive product” is not literally possible, as 
the discounts all apply to the same product.  Theoretically, the 
attribution test can be adapted by separating the contestable 
from the incontestable volumes.  While separating these volumes 
is theoretically possible, and can be modeled nicely when all the 
simplifying assumptions are made, this exercise is completely 
impractical and generally unusable in the real world.192  In Eisai, 
for instance, Eisai’s expert argued that Sanofi’s loyalty discounts 
“bundled contestable and incontestable demand for Lovenox.”193  
The expert attempted to put numbers to this theory, but, the 
court determined, the contestable and incontestable volumes did 
not divide cleanly because the drugs at issue had differing, 
sometimes unique, FDA-approved indications, and “the 
incontestable demand relating to these unique indications [wa]s 
attributable to the inherent properties of the product at issue, 
and thus competition on the merits.”194 
Rather than becoming entangled in this kind of messy 
endeavor, loyalty discounts should be properly analyzed like 
exclusive dealing arrangements; after all, the purpose of loyalty 
 
191 See Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust 
Law in the United States 1 (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 40, 
2005) (defining loyalty discounts as “a particular form of non-linear pricing in which 
the unit price of a good declines when the buyer’s purchases meet a buyer-specific 
minimum threshold requirement”). 
192 Greg Werden pointed out to us that the test may get things backwards. 
When the contestable volume is sufficiently low, no material exclusionary effect is 
possible—and yet the dominant firm’s discounts will typically fall outside the safe 
harbor. 
193 Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, No. 08-4168 (MLC), 2014 WL 
1343254, at *27 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2014). 
194 Id. 
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discounts is to induce a certain level of exclusivity.195  Loyalty 
discounts offer many of the same efficiencies as exclusive dealing 
arrangements.196  Moreover, modern exclusion theories premised 
upon loyalty discounts, like those based on exclusive dealing, are 
RRC theories—they hinge upon deprivation of scale and the 
notion that raising rivals’ costs may allow a defendant to create 
or maintain market power, not on below-cost pricing and 
recoupment.197  As with exclusive dealing, rivals and competition 
may be harmed by preventing a competitor from accessing 
sufficient volume, even if the defendant is pricing above cost.  
The equally efficient rival approach, therefore, offers a 
framework more closely aligned with the economics of the 
proffered exclusionary theory. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the 
fundamental issue in each exclusive dealing and loyalty discount 
cases is also the same.  In both instances, the essential question 
is whether the plaintiff is able to compete effectively by offering a 
comparable discount of its own.  If the answer is no, then we 
must ask whether the plaintiff’s inability to do so is attributable 
to a higher cost structure—or to simple unwillingness to offer 
better terms—in which case its claim should not be permitted. 
D. Tying 
One of the essential elements in any tying case is that the 
defendant somehow coerces the consumer into accepting the tied 
product.198  There is an application for the equally efficient rival 
test to tying because, if a rival can break the tie, or otherwise 
compete effectively for the business, then the defendant’s conduct 




195 See Jonathan M. Jacobson, A Note on Loyalty Discounts, ANTITRUST SOURCE 
1 (June 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_ 
source/Jun10_Jacobson6_24f.authcheckdam.pdf. 
196 See id.; Wright, supra note 161, at 20–22. 
197 See Jacobson, supra note 195, at 5 (“In circumstances where loyalty discounts 
may be harmful, the problem is not the price level; it is that rivals are denied access 
to customer volume. If the effect is to prevent rivals from constraining the 
defendant’s market power, consumer harm may result. Application of a predatory 
pricing standard does not accomplish the necessary analysis.”). 
198 See, e.g., Borschow Hosp. & Med. Supplies v. Cesar Castillo Inc., 96 F.3d 10, 
18 (1st Cir. 1996). 
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the allegedly unlawful tie is, in fact, a package of products that 
consumers value, that is competition on the merits, not 
exclusionary behavior. 
E. Refusals To Deal 
As discussed, the equally efficient rival approach provides a 
valuable and reasonably administrable screen for analyzing 
many types of exclusionary conduct; it is not, however, a test for 
every monopolization claim.  Refusals to deal are a good example 
of the approach’s limitations.  If the defendant controls an asset 
necessary to effective competition, no rival could be equally 
efficient.  Importantly, in a refusal to deal with rivals in the same 
market—that is, a purely horizontal refusal to deal—antitrust 
properly places a very high value on incentives to develop one’s 
own product, and, accordingly, such a refusal should only be 
actionable if it makes economic sense solely by virtue of the 
exclusion of rivals.199  In other words, the no economic sense or 
profit sacrifice test is appropriately applied to cases such as 
horizontal refusals to deal and price cutting, where the 
underlying activity is, typically, the very essence of competition 
and only in the rarest of occasions portends actual competitive 
harm.200  Even here, however, some inquiry into the availability 




199 See Susan A. Creighton & Jonathan M. Jacobson, Twenty-Five Years of 
Access Denials, 27 ANTITRUST 50, 54 (2012) (“Although we have questioned 
application of that [no economic sense or profit sacrifice test] in other contexts, when 
considering activities on which antitrust policy places a particularly high  
value—such as price cutting or, here, the ‘long recognized right of [a] 
trader . . . freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom 
he will deal’—the test works well.”); Jacobson & Sher, supra note 149, at 783 n.21 
(“[S]imilar to pricing, courts should be reluctant to interfere with a party’s decision 
not to share with rivals assets that it has developed or lawfully acquired. In this 
context, the no economic sense test works well to determine whether consumers will 
be harmed—protecting the defendant’s incentives to compete and innovate, while 
condemning refusals to deal where the defendant objectively sacrifices profit in the 
short term and, in the long term, can recoup that loss after its rivals are 
marginalized.”); Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 
2: The “No Economic Sense” Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 414 (2006). 
200 This is true for purely horizontal refusals to deal but not for vertical refusals 
to deal. Vertical refusals to deal, while framed as “refusal to deal” cases, are, in fact, 
sufficiently similar to either tying or exclusive dealing, depending upon the specific 
facts alleged, and are appropriately analyzed as such. 
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developed by the rival without undue difficulty, or obtained 
elsewhere on reasonable terms, the plaintiff does not have much 
of a claim. 
F. Product Design 
The equally efficient rival test, similarly, cannot be applied 
to product design challenges.  If the plaintiff’s product is an input 
requiring use of a product or service of the defendant, and is 
impacted by a product design change, analysis of the plaintiff’s 
efficiency is necessarily less relevant.  This is a difficult area in 
which the courts must weigh the very high value the law places 
on innovation—and the concomitant desire to avoid judicial 
second-guessing—against the possibility that trivial or illusive 
design changes may be in fact designed solely to exclude rivals.201  
There seems little room for equally efficient rival analysis in this 
context. 
CONCLUSION 
In the cases of an earlier era involving allegations of 
exclusionary conduct, the focus was solely on the conduct of the 
defendant.  More modern analysis properly looks to the effects on 
the plaintiff as well.  Because the issue is exclusion, and because 
the fundamental concern in the RRC paradigm is whether a rival 
can achieve minimum efficient scale, some inquiry into whether 
the plaintiff can or cannot compete effectively against the tactics 
in question is essential.  Conduct challenged as exclusionary may 
in fact prevent rivals from constraining the market power of a 
dominant firm.  But the effects of that conduct, almost 
invariably, are ambiguous:  Does the conduct prevent rivals from 
competing effectively or should it cause rivals to compete more 
effectively?  Distinguishing between these two effects is essential 
because the one threatens consumer harm while the other yields 
consumer benefits. 
There is no one-size-fits-all test for distinguishing 
exclusionary conduct from aggressive but legitimate competition.  
But by placing at least some of the focus on whether an efficient  
 
 
201 Compare United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65–67 (D.C. Cir. 
2001), with Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 
991, 998–1000 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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rival could meet or defeat the tactics in question, important light 
is shed on the ultimate question of consumer harm.  The law is 
moving in that direction, and that trend should continue. 
 
